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September 2023 National News
Fulmati Dhramdev Yadav v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd.
2023 SCC OnLine SC 1105
Facts:
The appellants in this case were the relatives of a driver who had died while carrying out activities in the course of his employment. The respondent had entered into a contract with the deceased’s employer to take care of any case in which compensation is payable as per section 3 of the Employees’ Compensation Act, 1923. It denied the claim of the appellants on the basis that the deceased’s employment had not been proved through documentary evidence. Due to this they approached the local Commissioner appointed under the 1923 Act for relief. The Commissioner awarded them a sum of money but the respondent got the award overturned in the first appeal. This led to the case coming before the Supreme Court.
Arguments of the parties:
The arguments made by counsel were not reproduced by the Court.
Issues:
Was the order of the Commissioner good in law?
Reasoning of the Court:
First of all, the Court pointed out that the Gujarat High Court had exercised appellate jurisdiction under section 30 of the 1923 Act despite there being no substantial question of law involved. This could not have been possible since the first proviso to section 30(1) makes the presence of such a question a pre-requisite for exercising appellate jurisdiction. It further pointed out that the High Court had made a mistake by reappreciating the evidence since the Commissioner is the last authority on facts. It noted that this had been held by the Supreme Court in numerous cases including Golla Rajamma v. Divisional Manager [(2017) 1 SCC 45].
The Court further found that the facts were such that the view of the Commissioner that the deceased had been employed was not an implausible view. Hence, the Court upheld the order given by the Commissioner.
Conclusion:
The appeal was allowed.
Dr. Kavita Yadav v. Secretary, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare Department
(2024) 1 SCC 421
Facts:
The appellant had been appointed as a Senior Resident in a hospital under the Government of the NCT of Delhi for a temporary period of one year which was extendable to up to 3 years. Her employment was extended to the maximum period of 3 years. She applied for 26 weeks of maternity leave under section 5 of the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961 during the last year of her employment but was told that she was eligible for only 11 days of leave since her employment ended in 11 days. The appellant failed to obtain relief before the Central Administrative Tribunal as well as the Delhi High Court due to which she approached the Supreme Court.
Arguments of the parties:
1. Appellant:
Counsel for the appellant argued that the appellant was entitled to the full period of maternity leave despite the short nature of her employment since all pre-conditions in section 5 of the 1961 Act had been fulfilled by her.
2. Respondent:
Counsel argued that the contractual period of employment could not be extended merely to provide the full extent of the benefit provided for in section 5. Any benefit had to be obtained within the chronal bounds of employment.
Issue:
Can the full benefit of section 5 of the 1961 Act accrue to a person despite the remainder of her employment being for a lesser period?
Reasoning of the Court:
The Court answered the issue in the affirmative. It relied on its judgments in the cases of MCD v. Female Workers (Muster Roll) [(2000) 3 SCC 224] and Deepika Singh v. PGIMER, Chandigarh [(2023) 13 SCC 681] to arrive at this conclusion since a similar decision was given in that case. It further referred to section 27 of the 1961 Act since it makes the 1961 Act override any contract which is contrary to the provisions of the statute. Hence, it held that the CAT and the High Court had erred in refusing to provide relief to the appellant.
It further noted that isolated readings of the provisions of the 1961 Act would not lead one to arrive at the answer that it had given to the issue, but that a joint reading would. Any move by the employer to remove the employee during the extended period of employment provided for the grant of maternity benefits would amount to “discharge”. Hence, it would be barred by section 12(2)(a) of the 1961 Act.
Conclusion:
The appeal was allowed.
L.R. Patil v. Gulbarga University, Gulbarga
2023 SCC OnLine SC 1110
Facts:
The appellant had been appointed as an Office Superintendent by the respondent. He applied for the post of Assistant Registrar and was selected. After serving a probation period of 2 years, he was to be appointed as the Assistant Registrar and removed from his earlier post. His appointment was assailed as being arbitrary in a writ petition. This led to him remaining a probationer in his new post. This petition was allowed and the University had to remove the appellant from his post. Writ petitions filed by the parties against the initial petition failed. The respondent appointed the appellant back to the post of Office Superintendent. He then made a representation for refixation of his seniority in his post and asked for promotion to the post of Assistant Registrar due to this seniority.
The respondent did not act on this representation due to which the appellant filed another writ which was allowed with an order to the respondent to consider the representation. The rejection of the representation led to another writ. However, this did not benefit the appellant since the Court held that he could not obtain the benefits of promotion since he had superannuated. Another writ was filed by the appellant to get rid of this order and he was successful.
In the present case, the appellant sought to argue in favour of refixation.
Arguments of the parties:
1. Petitioner:
Counsel pointed to Rule 20 Note 4 of the Karnataka Civil Service Rules (‘KCS Rules’) to show that the appellant had continued to have a lien on the post of Office Superintendent during the period in which his appointment to the higher post was uncertain. It was contended that cancellation of his selection could not wipe away the record of his lien and past service in the post of the Office Superintendent.
2. Respondent:
It was argued by counsel that the appellant had resigned from his earlier post when he was selected for the post of Assistant Registrar due to which he had to be treated as having resigned from his post within the meaning of Rule 252(b) of the KCS Rules. Further, the lack of any representation made by the appellant regarding the preservation of his lien had made him lose the lien and claim of seniority.
Issue:
Did the appellant’s lien over the post of Office Superintendent continue into the period immediately succeeding the filing of the initial petition questioning his selection to the post of Assistant Registrar?
Reasoning of the Court:
After perusing the KCS Rules, the Court arrived at the conclusion that a person would lose his right of lien over an earlier post only when he is substantively appointed to another post or absorbed permanently thereto. This had not happened in the present case since the appellant had always been a probationer and was never fully appointed as an Assistant Registrar. This being the case, his lien was never extinguished as per Rule 20 Note 4. Amongst other cases, it referred to State of Rajasthan v. S.N. Tiwari [(2009) 4 SCC 700] which was particularly pertinent for this case. Essentially the same conclusion regarding the point in time at which a lien is lost was reached in that case.
It dismissed the argument of the respondent by noting that Rule 252(b) stated that a civil servant removing himself from a post cannot be termed a resignation if he is doing so to take on another post after obtaining due permission. Hence, his seniority was refixed by the Court. He was granted the benefits which came with this holding, though only notionally since he had never held the post of Assistant Registrar as he had never been promoted to it.
Conclusion:
The appeal was allowed.
Jagpal Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh
2023 SCC OnLine SC 1080
Facts:
The appellant had been appointed on a temporary basis as a Collection Peon. His terms of employment stated that his employment could be terminated without notice at any time. His service was eventually terminated after almost 3 years of employment. He filed a writ under Article 226 before the Allahabad High Court against his termination. This petition was dismissed but a Letters Patent appeal (i.e. intra-court appeal) led to him being reinstated to his post pending final disposal of the matter.
During this time, he was promoted to the post of Collection Amin despite the curious nature of his employment. The High Court decided against the appellant due to default. The local sub-divisional magistrate passed an order stating that his promotion was meaningless due to this dismissal and hence his status reverted to that of a Collection Peon. Thus, it was stated that the earlier termination of his employment was still valid.
A writ was filed against this order by the appellant. The High Court allowed the petition noting that the promotion was not made contingent on anything. An appeal by the respondent led to the High Court reversing its earlier order by noting that dismissal of the appellant’s initial writ led to him losing the benefit of the interim order.
The instant case was an SLP filed against the latest verdict of the Allahabad High Court.
Arguments of the parties:
1. Appellant:
The employment of a person like the appellant who had been in service for a long period of time could not be terminated if a conscious decision to promote him had taken place.
2. Respondent:
The appellant had no right to be employed either as a Collection Peon or a Collection Amin after his employment had been terminated and upheld as valid by a Court. The interim order would be of no use to the appellant since his termination was eventually upheld.
Issue:
Was the order of the sub-divisional magistrate bad in law?
Reasoning of the Court:
The Court agreed with the argument made by the counsel for the respondent as well as the latest verdict of the Allahabad High Court. Hence, it held that the promotion of the appellant would not save him from being left out of a job.
Conclusion:
The SLP was dismissed.
Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner v. M/s G4S Security Services (India) Ltd.
Civil Appeal No. 9284 of 2013
Facts:
The appellant was of the opinion that the respondent had been wrongly splitting the wages of its employees and considering the reduced wage to be the basic wage while calculating the sum that it had to give to the provident fund. This view was held to be incorrect by the Appellate Tribunal instituted under the Employees Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (‘1952 Act’).
A writ was filed by the appellant before the Punjab and Haryana High Court. This petition was dismissed and it did not gain a favourable order in an intra-court appeal. This led the appellant to file the instant appeal.
Arguments of the parties:
1. Appellant:
‘Basic wages’ under the 1952 Act have to be determined by looking at the minimum wages set under section 3 of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948.
2. Respondent:
Arguments made by counsel for the respondent were not noted down in the order of the Court.
Issue:
Was the respondent’s method of calculating PF contributions bad in law?
Reasoning of the Court:
The Court dismissed the appellant’s argument by pointing out that ‘basic wages’ have been given a specific definition under section 2(b) of the 1952 Act. Hence, the appellant’s argument was not logical since the definition itself would have made a reference to minimum wages if the legislature intended for basic wages to hold that meaning. Thus, the Court upheld the method used by the respondent to calculate contributions.
It also noted that the appellant had not contested a similar order passed on 23rd May, 2002 by the APFC instituted under section 7A of the 1952 Act.
Conclusion:
The appeal was dismissed.
Union of India v. H.R. Vijaya Kumar
Civil Appeal No. 7351 of 2013
Facts:
The respondent had been employed by the Central Industrial Security Force (‘CISF’) before he resigned from his position to join Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (‘HAL’). While determining the benefits to which he was entitled after leaving CISF, it was held that he would not be entitled to pro rata monthly pension since he had not applied to HAL with due permission. The Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1972 (‘1972 Rules’) were used to arrive at this conclusion. This led to the respondent filing a writ petition before the Karnataka High Court which succeeded. However, despite this, the CISF passed an order stating that he was disentitled to pension benefits as per Rule 26 of the 1972 Rules since he had not mentioned that he was leaving for HAL in his resignation letter.
Another writ petition was filed before the High Court. This led to the Court observing that the respondent had sought permission from the appellant for his application to HAL. There had been a delay in the appellant’s processing of this request but it was eventually rejected. Hence, the Court once again decided in favour of the respondent. The intra-court appeal failed since the Court held that an application of Rule 26 to the facts did not reveal that the respondent was disentitled to pension. This led to the instant appeal before the Supreme Court.
Arguments of the parties:
1. Appellant:
It was argued that the appellant could not apply to another job without obtaining prior permission given that he had been a member of the CISF, a security organisation. Thus, Rule 26(2) disentitled him from obtaining pro rata monthly pension.
2. Respondent:
Counsel argued that it ought to be held that the respondent is entitled to pension since he had always kept his supervisor informed regarding his application to HAL including the various stages of his application.
Issue:
Had compliance with Rule 26 of the 1952 Rules taken place so as to entitle the respondent to pro rata monthly pension?
Reasoning of the Court:
The Court held that Rule 26(2) was quite clear due to which the respondent would be disentitled to pro rata monthly pension since he had taken up employment at HAL without obtaining the necessary permission. Hence, it was held that the Karnataka High Court had erred in granting verdict in favour of the respondent.
Conclusion:
The appeal was allowed.
State of Punjab v. Jaswant Singh
(2023) 9 SCC 150
Facts:
The respondent had been employed as a probationary constable with the Punjab police. However, he was discharged under Rule 12.21 of the Punjab Police Rules, 1934 (‘1934 Rules’). This had happened since he had not reported back to his Training Centre after completing an assignment as a security guard due to which it was inferred that he was not interested in completing his training and that he lacked a sense of responsibility. Litigation ensued and the case eventually reached the High Court. In second appeal, the Punjab and Haryana High upheld its first judgment through which it had declared the respondent’s dismissal to be illegal. It also upheld the mandatory injunction through which all service related benefits were granted to the respondent.
Arguments of the parties:
1. Appellants:
It was contended by counsel that Rule 12.21 of the 1934 Rules had been properly exercised by the authorities within the mandated period of the first three years after gaining employment. The main reason cited for exercising Rule 12.21 was the respondent’s lack of both interest and sense of responsibility. It was argued that the discharge order was not punitive in nature.
2. Respondent:
It was argued that the discharge order was punitive in nature. Further, since the reason for discharge was based on alleged misconduct on the part of the respondent, an inquiry had to be conducted under Rule 16.24. No such inquiry was conducted due to which the lower courts had rightly set aside the discharge order.
Issue:
Was the discharge order valid as per the 1934 Rules?
Reasoning of the Court:
The Supreme Court relied on State of Punjab v. Balbir Singh [(2004) 11 SCC 743] to reach the conclusion that an order of discharge under Rule 12.21 is not punitive in nature. In this case, it was also held that there is a distinction between termination simpliciter and punitive termination. The former will have occurred if discharge occurs after considering whether the employee is suitable for his job or not. The latter will have occurred if termination occurs after an inquiry is conducted to find out any misconduct and then he is terminated on the basis of such misconduct. The case of Ravindra Kumar Misra v. Uttar Pradesh State Handloom Corporation Ltd. [1987 Supp SCC 739] was also cited since it reached a similar conclusion as to this binary.
The Court held that the lower courts had misunderstood Rule 12.21 and thereby decided in favour of the respondent. It held that Rule 12.21 had been fully complied with by the appellants and that there was no need for an inquiry under Rule 16.24. Hence, it set aside the verdicts of the lower courts and decided in favour of the appellants.
Conclusion:
The appeal was allowed.
National Law University Jodhpur v. Prashant Mehta
2023 LiveLaw (SC) 785
In this order, the Supreme Court observed that it was unacceptable for NLUs to function by using contractual teachers. It reiterated that the UGC Regulations state that the maximum quantity of contractual staff permissible is 10%, unlike what some regulations of certain NLUs state.
It stated that it would rather give time to NLUJ to remedy the situation itself rather than it pass an order mandating changes in teaching staff. The matter was ordered to be listed for directions on 31.10.2023.
Smt. Vidya Rawat v. State of Uttar Pradesh
2023 LiveLaw (SC) 785
Facts:
The appellant had been employed as an assembly girl by the respondent but her employment was eventually terminated. This eventually led to proceedings before a labour court. The court held that the termination was illegal and ordered her reinstatement. However, it made no order for payment of back wages without providing any reason for doing so. This led to the instant writ petition.
Arguments of the parties:
1. Petitioner:
The petitioner mainly drew attention to the fact that the labour court had not provided its reasoning for not granting back wages.
2. Respondent:
Arguments made by the counsel for the respondent were not recorded.
Issues:
Had the labour court erred in not granting back wages to the appellant?
Reasoning of the Court:
The Court extensively quoted from the judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Charan Singh [2015 AIR SC 2615] to hold that payment of back wages is the norm once termination has been held to be unlawful.
The petitioner was allowed to move an application under section 6H(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 for the purpose of calculating back wages.
Conclusion:
The petition was allowed.
B. Saravanan v. Deputy Inspector General of Police
2023 SCC OnLine Mad 5784
Facts:
The petitioner was an inspector of police. His wife was impregnated through In Vitro Fertilization (IVF) due to which he needed to take care of her for the duration of the pregnancy. A leave of 90 days was sought by the petitioner and it was granted as well by the second respondent. However, it was cancelled a day before it was to start by citing a law and order issue.
A writ petition was filed by the petitioner before the Madras High Court which led to the Court giving him liberty to approach the first respondent to obtain appropriate relief. The first respondent ordered leave for only 30 days. The petitioner’s wife gave birth on the day immediately succeeding the last day of the sanctioned leave. He could not report for duty on that day and communicated his inability to be physically present for submitting a leave application through a WhatsApp message. A desertion order under Police Standing Order 95(1) was passed against the petitioner a few weeks after this. This instant case was a writ petition filed before the Madras High Court against this order.
Arguments of the parties:
1. Petitioner:
Extended leave ought to have been granted since the petitioner’s wife had just given birth and since there was no one else who could take care of her.
2. Respondent:
The petitioner had never made an official application for extension of leave. Further, he had deserted his office without notice. It was also pointed out that the petitioner had not complied with the undertaking given by him in the earlier proceedings that he would report to duty from a particular date which had already passed.
Issue:
Was the desertion order bad in law?
Reasoning of the Court:
The Court was of the opinion that the leave granted to the petitioner ought to have been extended given the fact that his wife had just given birth. It held that the care taken of the child by the mother and father during the early development of the child is crucial for its survival. Hence, it held that maternity leave and paternity leave are guaranteed to every child by Articles 15(3) and 21 of the Constitution. Thus, it declared that the non-extension of leave and the passing of the desertion order amounted to a violation of Article 21 of the petitioner’s child.
The petitioner was asked to appear before the first respondent with the medical records of his wife and an apology letter and provide an explanation for his unauthorized absence. The reinstatement of the petitioner to his earlier post was also ordered since the period provided for replying to the desertion order had run out.
Conclusion:
The petition was allowed.
Chief Executive Officer v. Suraiyya Rafik Khalifa (Shaikh)
2023 SCC OnLine Bom 1516
Facts:
The respondents had filed a claim for compensation under section 4(1)(a) of the Employee’s Compensation Act, 1923 (‘1923 Act’) since their deceased relative had died while carrying out his duties in the course of his employment. He was not directly employed by the appellants but was instead employed by a contractor working under the appellants. He had been working as the driver of a water tanker when he passed away due to a heart attack. His body was found below the tanker. The claim, along with interest and penalty amount under section 4A, was granted by the labour court due to which the appellants filed the instant appeal under section 30 of the 1923 Act.
Arguments of the parties:
1. Appellants:
It was argued by counsel that the deceased had never been employed by the appellants. It was further argued as an alternative argument that the cause of death was natural and not related to the work which the deceased had to do. Further, it was also argued that the cause of death itself was unclear since it was not disclosed by the post-mortem report.
Lastly, it was argued that the principal employer could not be made liable for interest and penalty amount since these were not encompassed by the term “compensation” used in section 12(1) of the 1923 Act.
2. Respondents:
Counsel argued that the deceased had clearly passed away due to heart issues as the post-mortem report showed enlargement of the heart and infraction of the left ventricle. This was sufficient to show that a heart attack had taken place. Further, the deceased had been overworked with no fixed working hours.
It was further argued that there was no substantial question of law involved in this appeal so as to justify it under section 30. Only issues of fact were raised in the appeal due to which the appeal ought to be dismissed in limine.
Issues:
1. Was the commissioner justified in holding that the deceased had died in the course of employment especially since the appellants were not a party to the water supply agreement which led to the deceased being hired?
2. Was there a causal connection between the cause of death and the duties which the deceased had to undertake in the course of his employment?
3. Can penalty amount under section 4A(3)(b) and the interest be imposed against the principal employer by utilizing section 12(1)?
Reasoning of the Court:
With regards to the first issue the Bombay High Court held that there could be no dispute regarding the fact that while the deceased had been employed by original respondent no. 3, the principal employer had been the appellants. It was noted that the agreement under which the work was being done specifically noted that original respondent no.3 was working under the supervision and control of the appellants. Hence, it answered the first issue in the affirmative.
Coming to the second issue, the Court concluded that the deceased had been under considerable physical and mental stress since his work involved travelling 60 kilometres to collect water and then distributing it at multiple places. Further, the work of water distribution occurred 24/7 during the summer months. It relied on the case of Mst. Param Pal Singh v. National Insurance Co. in which the Supreme Court had declared that there was a causal connection between a heart attack and a deceased truck driver’s work. It further relied on its previous judgment in Harvinder Kaur Vishakha Singh v. Tarvinder Singh K. Singh [(2022) 2 AIR Bom R 187] in which it had noted that death by heart attack is an accident.
Lastly, with regards to the third issue, the Court held that this was a substantial question of law. It answered the issue in the negative and held that only the immediate employer would be liable to pay the interest and penalty amount. Hence, it held that “compensation” in section 12(1)(a) does not include interest and penalty amount. It relied on its judgment in Sarjerao Unkar Jadhav v. Gurindar Singh [1990 Mah LJ 790] in which it had been held that ‘compensation’, ‘interest’, and ‘penalty’ denote distinct concepts which do not overlap with each other.
Conclusion:
The appeal was partly allowed.
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